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The Emergence of Non-Traditional Cooperative Structures: 
Public and Private Policy Issues 
Agricultural cooperatives have played an important economic role in market economies as 
indicated by their substantial levels of asset ownership, sales, and market share in North America 
and Western Europe.  Historically, growth capital employed to attain these levels was sourced 
from either debt instruments or internally generated earnings.  Success in generating internal 
capital was largely a function of the flexibility of control over payments to members in the form 
of patronage dividends, equity redemption, and most importantly for marketing cooperatives, 
payments to members for produce. 
More recently, however, agricultural cooperatives have been facing survival challenges 
as a result of the agricultural industrialization process.  Competitive strategies pursued by 
agricultural cooperatives in response to environmental and structural changes in the food system 
– including value-added processing, brand name development, and entry into international 
markets – require substantial capital investments.  In order to acquire the necessary risk capital to 
implement these growth related strategies and remain competitive, agricultural cooperatives are 
adapting to agricultural industrialization by means of organizational innovations.  These 
organizational innovations include but are not limited to: new generation cooperatives, base 
capital plans, subsidiaries with partial public ownership, preferred trust shares, equity seeking 
joint ventures, combined limited liability company-cooperative strategic alliances, and 
permanent capital equity plans.  These new organizational and capital formation experiments 
have created considerable interest among producer leaders, cooperative management, finance 
institutions and organizational scholars.  We assert that the basic issues in examining these new 
models can be reduced to an examination of ownership and control rights.   2
Chaddad and Cook analyze these emerging models by describing various 
organizational attributes including ownership structure, membership policy, voting rights, 
governance structures, residual claim rights, distribution of benefits and the strategy-structure 
interface.  Building upon property rights and incomplete contracts theories of the firm, the 
authors adopt a broad definition of ownership rights that encompasses both residual claim and 
control rights.  They argue that alternative cooperative models differ in the way ownership rights 
are defined and assigned to the economic agents tied contractually to the firm – in particular, 
members, patrons, and investors. Based on multiple examples, they propose a typology of 
discrete organizational models, in which the traditional cooperative structure and the investor-
oriented firm (IOF) are characterized as polar forms. 
This paper builds on Chaddad and Cook to discuss the implications of the observed 
departures from the traditional cooperative structure. In particular, we discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of each model to cooperative stakeholders and raise issues to public policy 
towards agricultural cooperatives.  In the next section, the proposed typology is introduced. 
 
Ownership Rights in New Cooperative Models 
Many economists would agree that the institution of ownership in the form of secure 
property rights is the most effective mechanism for providing economic agents with appropriate 
incentives to create, maintain, and improve assets.  But what does “ownership” mean?  The 
economic analysis of ownership has heretofore concentrated on two distinct concepts: residual 
returns (or claims) and residual rights of control. 
Residual rights of control are defined as the rights to make any decision regarding the use 
of an asset that is not explicitly attenuated by law or assigned to other parties by contract.    3
Residual rights of control emerge from the impossibility of crafting, implementing and enforcing 
complete contracts, especially in the case of complex, dynamic transactions.  Since all contracts 
are unavoidably incomplete, it is the residual right of control over an asset that defines who is the 
“owner” of that asset (Grossman and Hart).  According to the incomplete contract theory of the 
firm, the assignment of control rights (and hence ownership) is dictated by ex ante investment 
incentives of contracting parties.  The theory predicts that residual rights of control are assigned 
to agents making relationship specific investments whose quasi-rents are under risk from hold-up 
behavior. 
Economists define residual claims as the rights to the net income generated by the firm – 
i.e., the amount left over after all promised payments to fixed claim holders (e.g., employees, 
debtors).  Additionally, residual claimants are considered the residual risk bearers of the firm 
because net cash flows are uncertain and eventually negative.  The “owners” of the firm are the 
residual claimants according to property rights scholars (Fama, Fama and Jensen). 
Table 1 summarizes ownership rights characteristics of alternative organizational forms, 
including open corporations, proprietorships, financial mutual companies, and traditional 
cooperatives.  For instance, the open corporation is characterized by unrestricted residual claims 
that are non-redeemable but freely tradable among investors in secondary equity capital markets.  
The horizon of residual claims is unlimited because they are rights in net cash flows for the life 
of the organization.  In addition, residual claimants are not required to play any other function in 
the firm.  The unrestricted nature of common stock residual claims enables the efficient 
allocation of risk and the specialization of risk bearing and decision-making functions in open 
corporations.  Contrasting to open corporations, non-corporate organizational forms usually add 
restrictions on residual claims that may affect asset investment and use as suggested in Table 1.   4
Table 1.  Ownership rights structure of alternative organizational forms 
 













Yes No No No 












Unlimited  As long as 
proprietor 
As long as 
customer 








No  No  Yes, on customer 
demand 
Yes, but Board’s 
discretion 
 
Drawing from the property rights theory of the firm, Chaddad and Cook propose a 
typology of discrete organizational arrangements (i.e., cooperative models) based upon a broad 
definition of ownership rights comprising both residual return and control rights.  They argue 
that cooperative organizational models may be distinguished by the way ownership rights are 
defined and assigned to economic agents tied contractually to the firm (members, patrons, and 
investors).  According to the proposed typology, the traditional cooperative and the investor-
oriented firm (IOF) are polar organizational forms (Figure 1).  The traditional cooperative 
structure is defined as having the following property rights attributes: ownership rights are 
restricted to member-patrons; residual return rights are non-transferable, non-appreciable and 
redeemable; and benefits are distributed to members in proportion to patronage.  As a result of 
this “vaguely defined” property rights structure, traditional cooperatives are subject to 
investment and governance constraints (Vitaliano, Staatz, Cook).   5
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In addition to these polar forms of organization, Figure 1 identifies five non-traditional 
cooperative models.  In other words, organizational variation is observed in the ownership rights 
structure of cooperative firms.  In doing so, the typology refines the property rights analysis of 
alternative organizational forms by identifying five cooperative models that introduce 
organizational innovations to the traditional cooperative structure.  In the upward egressing 
branch of Figure 1, three non-traditional models with ownership rights restricted to member-
patrons are described: proportional investment cooperative, member-investor cooperative, and 
new generation cooperative.   6
Proportional investment cooperative.  In this model, ownership rights are restricted to 
members, non-transferable, non-appreciable and redeemable, but members are expected to invest 
in the cooperative in proportion to patronage.  Proportional investment cooperatives adopt capital 
management policies to ensure proportionality of internally generated capital including separate 
capital pools and base capital plans.  The base capital plan has been adopted by numerous well-
known U.S. cooperatives, including Riceland, CoBank, Land O’ Lakes, and Dairy Farmers of 
America. 
Member-investor cooperative. This model differs from the traditional cooperative 
structure in that returns are distributed to members in proportion to shareholdings in addition to 
patronage.  This is done either with dividend distribution in proportion to shares and/or 
appreciability of cooperative shares. The member-investor model has been implemented by 
means of participation units (Campina Melkunie), capital units (Walgett Special One 
Cooperative) and redeemable preference shares (Tatura Milk Industries Limited and Fonterra 
Cooperative Group). 
New generation cooperative.  The new generation cooperative model is another departure 
from the traditional cooperative structure as the restriction on residual claim transferability is 
relaxed.  The rationale for equity share transferability is to provide liquidity and capital 
appreciation through secondary market valuation.  The new generation cooperative model 
introduces ownership rights in the form of delivery rights that are tradable among a well-defined 
producer at risk member-patron group.  Ownership rights are restricted to member-patrons, 
membership is defined, members are required to make up-front investment in delivery rights in 
proportion to patronage, and supply is controlled by means of marketing agreements.   7
Cooperatives that have exhausted these structural options are making a more complex 
decision – whether to acquire equity capital from non-member sources.  In the downward 
egressing branch of Figure 1, ownership rights are not restricted to member-patrons.  
Consequently, the cooperative is able to acquire risk capital from non-member sources.  The 
more radical model in this branch – conversion to IOF – is an exit strategy adopted by 
cooperatives that choose not to continue operating as a user owned and controlled organization 
(Schrader, Collins)
1.  Alternatively, cooperatives may acquire risk capital from outside investors 
without converting by means of two models: cooperatives with capital seeking entities and 
investor-share cooperatives. 
Cooperatives with capital seeking entities.  In this model, investors acquire ownership 
rights in a separate legal entity wholly or partly owned by the cooperative.  In other words, 
outside investor capital is not directly introduced in the cooperative firm, but in trust companies 
(Diamond of California), strategic alliances (e.g., Dairy Farmers of America), or subsidiaries (the 
Irish Model, Crédit Agricole). 
Investor-share cooperative.  In this model, the cooperative acquires non-member equity 
capital without converting to an IOF.  Contrasting to the previous model, the investor-share 
cooperative issues separate classes of equity shares assigned to different “owner” groups.  As a 
result, outside investors receive ownership rights in the cooperative in addition to the traditional 
cooperative ownership rights held by member-patrons.  Investor shares may bundle different 
ownership rights in terms of returns, risk bearing, control, redeemability, and transferability.  
Investor shares include preferred stock (CoBank, CHS Cooperatives), non-voting common stock 
(Saskatchewan Wheat Pool), and participation certificates (in France). 
                                                 
1 Instead of conversion, the most common exit strategy for U.S. agricultural cooperatives is through mergers and 
acquisitions. According to a USDA report, there have been 777 cooperative unification activities, including mergers 
and acquisitions, between 1989 and 1998 (Wadsworth).   8
Private Policy Implications 
The typology described in this paper suggests that agricultural cooperatives are 
increasingly relaxing some of the structural constraints imposed by the traditional model.  In 
particular, restrictions on traditional cooperative ownership rights are attenuated to provide 
members with incentives to invest or to acquire non-member capital.  This in turn suggests that 
departures from the traditional model are motivated by the need to ameliorate perceived financial 
constraints. 
Our analysis of the emergence of non-traditional cooperative models also suggests that 
the solution of perceived financial constraints entails some degree of organizational redesign 
rather than the extreme solution of conversion or demutualization.  That is, ownership rights 
related to residual return and control rights of agents tied contractually to the firm are redefined 
and reassigned.  However, when restrictions on traditional cooperative ownership rights are 
attenuated, new organization costs may surface such as principal-agent costs, collective decision 
making costs, and influence costs.  More specifically, members may have to share profits and 
eventually control rights with outside investors who are not necessarily patrons of the 
cooperative and thus may have diverging interests.  Conflicting goals between maximizing 
returns to investors and maximizing returns to member-patrons may occur as a result. 
In other words, there are trade-offs involved in organizational redesign that cooperative 
leaders should be aware of.  Table 2 presents some advantages and disadvantages associated with 
each non-traditional model.  It is intended to facilitate a better informed strategic decision 
making process between cooperative managers, directors, and members in choosing among 
alternative cooperative ownership structures. 
   9
Table 2. Comparison of non-traditional cooperative models 
Non-Traditional Model  Advantages  Disadvantages 
Proportional Investment 
Cooperative 
• Base capital tied to strategic 
capital requirements 
• Flexibility 
• Member ownership and 
control 
• Fairness 
• Systematic equity redemption 
• Not suitable for cooperatives 
with high member turnover 
• May require substantial capital 
requirements by members 
• Not source of permanent 
equity capital 




• Member ownership and 
control 
• Incentives to invest 
• Return on invested capital 
• Interest divergence 
• Member-patrons vs. member-
investors 
• Non-permanent equity capital 




• Incentives to invest 
• Performance measure 
• Incentive compensation to 
management 
• Permanent source of equity 
capital 
• Cash patronage refunds 
• Barrier to new member entry 
• Illiquid secondary market for 
delivery rights 




• Non-member equity capital 
• Flexibility 
• Focused, specialized 
management 
• Share in profits 
• Market access 
• Control 
• Conflicts of interest 
• Transfer price 
Irish Model  • Non-member, permanent 
equity capital 
• Access to equity markets 
• Unrestricted ownership rights 
• Market value of shares 
• Members have access to 
capital gains and dividend 
income 
• Control 
• Divergence of interest 
• Transfer price 
• Equity market oversight 
• Need to perform 
• Transition to IOF 
Investor Share 
Cooperative 
• Non-member, permanent 
equity capital 
• Access to equity markets 
• Control 
• Divergence of interest 
• Different classes of share 
   10
Public Policy Implications 
Clearly, the emergence of non-traditional cooperative models takes the definition of the 
cooperative as a user owned and controlled organization to the limit.  The ownership rights 
approach to analyzing boundaries of the firm and control – residual claim trade offs can also be 
used to inform public policy debates regarding the degree and role of producers not only as users 
but also investors in the global food chain.  Most analysts agree that the uncertainties associated 
with globalization, food chain consolidation and vertical coordination, environmental constraints, 
genetic modification and food safety have created an environment in which the public interest 
must be clearly defined and communicated.  A basic public policy issue is to what degree and 
what role should producers be allowed to participate in this new institutional environment.  If the 
public objective is to facilitate the continuance of the countervailing power and rural 
development benefits produced by an institutional arrangement that in the past was beneficial to 
both the American food consumer and the producer then modifications to our current state and 
national legislation and regulation should be contemplated. 
Through application of the framework presented in the private policy implications section 
of this paper public policy can be informed as to what general form organizational design 
characteristics might influence the incentive structure to encourage producer involvement in the 
food chain.  These general areas include tax law, securities law, and cooperative incorporation 
law.  Each can be informed by application of the property rights principles defined in previous 
sections of this paper.  This framework would be particularly important in addressing the 
residual control-residual claim trade offs in analysis of the “income allocated based on 
patronage” cooperative principle.  Informing the consequent issues of subordination of capital, 
limitations of patronage sourced income, tax credits and losses, and governance could lead to   11




The rapid and fundamental structural changes occurring in the global agricultural and 
food system – commonly referred to as the industrialization of agriculture – exposes agricultural 
cooperatives to heightened domestic and international competition from other business forms. 
These changes also suggest that it is important to consider whether the organizational structures 
that have evolved in the past are likely to remain appropriate for the future. The success of 
agricultural cooperatives in responding to the challenges brought about by agricultural 
industrialization is likely to depend on their strategic choices and organizational structure. Yet it 
is important for cooperative leaders contemplating organizational change to bear in mind that 
“the decision of which organizational form to choose depends on the fundamental orientation of 
the producer-owners” (Royer, 1992, p. 96). It is thus crucial that adequate communication exists 
between cooperative leaders and members.  This paper contributes to this dialogue by describing 
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